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ABSTRACT
This research observed that all Brazilian institutions for climate change policy adopted the same 
governance model, characterized by three common factors: (1) institutional diversity, (2) cooperation 
and (3) political competition. An analysis of the Inter-Ministerial Commission on Global Climate Change 
(CIMMGC in Portuguese) was realized. The idea was to assess the effects of a bigger institutional 
diversity on cooperation and political competition among actors involved in the institution mentioned 
above. Some elements, such as the elevated inclusiveness of political actors and the accountability 
reinforcement in the political decision-making process are essential to this Case Study. The outcome 
of this analysis pointed out that no democratic governance absence could result from a bigger political 
inclusiveness in the decision-making process of the Brazilian climate change policy. The Inter-Ministerial 
Commission on Global Climate Change (ICGCC) did not lose its institutional dynamism and decision-
making authority on goals delegated by the Brazilian National Plan on Climate Change, despite the 
reinforcement of accountability mechanisms in political process.
Keywords: Political Institutions; Environmental Policy; Brazilian Climate Change Policy.
RESUMO
Observou-se que um mesmo modelo de governança foi configurado na política brasileira de mudança do 
clima, caracterizando em comum três fatores às instituições responsáveis por essa política: (1) diversidade 
institucional, (2) cooperação e (3) competição política. Por meio de um estudo de caso, buscou-se tomar, 
como unidade de análise, a Comissão Interministerial de Mudança Global do Clima (CIMMGC). O objetivo 
foi observar em que medida a maior diversidade institucional, caracterizada pela elevada inclusividade 
de atores políticos e o reforço de accountability no processo político decisório, fomentou mais cooperação 
e menos competição política entre os atores políticos envolvidos na CIMMGC. Os resultados apontaram 
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que a maior inclusividade política no processo decisório da política brasileira de mudança do clima não 
incorreu em ausência de governabilidade democrática. No caso da CIMMGC, o modelo consociativo da 
política brasileira de mudança do clima reforçou mecanismos de accountability no processo político, 
sem perder, em contrapartida, dinamismo institucional e capacidade decisória nos objetivos políticos 
outorgados à instituição pela Política e Plano Nacional sobre Mudança do Clima.
Palavras-chave: Instituições Políticas; Política Ambiental; Política Brasileira de Mudanças Climáticas.
1 INTRODUCTION  
This paper analysis the governance of the Brazilian politics on climate change, using for this purpose, 
the method of case study (YIN, 2001). By observing the Brazilian politics on climate change pattern, 
it is possible to affirm that the same consociational governance model was adopted to all institutions 
involved with climatic change policy, featuring in common to the institutions responsible for this policy, 
three factors: (1) institutional diversity, cooperation (2) and (3) competition policy. The Inter-ministerial 
Commission on Global Climate Change (ICGCC) has been taken as the unit of analysis, for the purpose 
of observing the extent to which greater institutional diversity promoted more or less cooperation and 
political competition between the political actors involved in the institution.
The research question was, in front of a diverse institutional composition and the rules of their decision-
making process (protected by the rule of unanimity), why was not possible to point an operative 
paralysis or institutional inertia in their activities, when observing the political process ICGCC? The 
research applied a double hypothesis. The more actors directly involved in the decision-making process 
of Brazilian politics of global climate change, would be the biggest trends inclusiveness and democratic 
governance (1st hypothesis), and greater accountability in the policy-making process, which resulted in 
no operative paralysis or institutional immobility (2nd hypothesis).
Especially two strategies for integrated data collection were used in this study: (1) consultation and 
analysis of institutional reports issued, especially, by ICGCC; but also for others related to governance 
of Brazilian politics of climate change and institutional bodies; and (2), in-depth interviews and semi-
structured interviews with the policy makers directly involved with the national policy on climate 
change and especially allocated in ICGCC. This one allowed mapping the horizontal character of the 
decision-making process ICGCC.
2 HOW THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN MATTERS IN THE BRAZILIAN POLITICS’ 
GOVERNANCE MODEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE?
The environmental policy in Brazil suffers from synergistic cooperation in relation to other policies, 
especially the idiosyncrasy of public management around a decision-making system that hinders 
horizontal coordination in environmental management between the institutions (AZEVEDO-SANTOS, 
FEARNSIDE, OLIVEIRA, et al, 2017; HOCHSTETLER, 2017). Democratic rules broadly affect the power 
play in political decision-making process (STEIN & TOMMASI, 2007; CAPELLA, 2007; RODRIGUES et 
al, 2015). The institutionalization of Brazilian politics of climate change has also stimulated a higher 
transaction cost between actors, apparently resulting in competing political and decision-making 
powers between institutions involved precisely for dealing with environmental issues in an isolated 
way and not interdependent, recurrent feature in the environmental field.
The National Policy on Climate Change established institutions which would be responsible for the 
governance of an essentially environmental policy with direct connections to the performance of 
the Brazilian economy, as demand is Brazilian policy on climate change. In its Article 7, the National 
Climate Change Policy determines the political-institutional framework for coordination, formulation 
and implementation:
[…] Art. 7 The institutional tools for the work of the National Policy on Climate Change include:
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I - the Inter-ministerial Committee on Climate Change;
II - the Inter-ministerial Commission on Global Climate Change;
III - the Brazilian Forum on Climate Change. […]
The processes of formulating environmental policies (and it is no different in the case of climate change 
policy), in general, are characterized by highly complex due to the diversity of actors involved, including: 
(i) different degrees of power, and (ii) number of incentives (DONADELLI, 2017; MOURA & JATOBÁ, 
2009; RODRIGUES, 2011; LEZAMA, 2004). The climate change as an environmental policy can illustrate 
how transversality involves the environment matter, both politically and institutionally (DOMINGUEZ, 
2010; CORRALES, 2007).). And in the case of Brazilian politics for climate change, it was possible to 
observe the existence of different degrees of power in relation to politics, with some “key institutions” 
involved more directly in the formulation of Brazilian politics of climate change, as ICGCC and in the 
“rendering of accounts”, the FBMC. 
It was requested, by the Brazilian government, to operationalize this policy, an institutional extension 
of powers for the ministerial coordination, especially the INTER-MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE (ICCC) and the Executive Group (Executive Group on Climate Change [EGCC]) and ICGCC - more 
involved in the formulation, regulation and technical operation politics - and FBMC - more linked to the 
consultative and deliberative politics - agencies directly responsible for formulating and implementing 
the Brazilian policy of climate change, coordinate their policies of mitigation and adaption to climate 
change and the “accountability “ of this policy¹.
The Executive Group on Climate Change (EGCC) was created within the MIC, under the MMA 
coordination, which allowed that the purpose of the climate agenda contained the environmental 
component and could reflect the effective participation and decision of the MMA on consultation and 
formulation of NPCC. The most significant political breakthrough work of Executive Group on Climate 
Change (EGCC), according to the NPCC it was being sent to the Legislative, the proposed National Policy 
on Climate Change, through the Draft Act n. 3,535/2008. 
The FBMC, created by Presidential Decree nº 3,515 of June 20, 2000, with the additional effects by Decrees 
of August 28, 2000 and November 14, 2000, was responsible for being, in terms of the institutional point 
of view, a consultative political space around climate change, involving a multiplicity of political and social 
actors directly or indirectly related to mitigation and adaptation to the climate change.
As an alternative arranged around more consociative policies, the FBMC stimulated since its genesis, 
a broad consultation of stakeholders around sectoral demands formulating proposals and policies that 
address, at the national level, actions taken with issues relating to the climate change  and its triple 
unfolding: (i) environmental, (ii) social and (iii) economic. Since the creation and Policy regulation 
and the National Plan on Climate Change, the role of FBMC as a consultative space of sectoral plans 
contained in the Plan was highlighted. Another important role of the FBMC, e.g., aspect was the 
proposal of a National Policy on confronting Climate Changes (PANEMC), submitted to the Ministry of 
Environment in 2007 (FBMC, 2007).
The FBMC attempts to propose coordinated initiatives with existing policies to combine efforts (at the 
federal level as well as state and local civil society and encouraging entrepreneurial initiatives) for the 
purposes of mitigation, adaptation and mitigation of the impact of diverse changes climate in Brazil. 
The importance of FBMC was not only “illustrative”, but a fundamental propositional political space for 
the achievement and good progress of the Brazilian political on climate change. Through the analysis of 
the meetings reports of the FBMC since the imposition of the NPCC (2007), was observed a regularity 
of meetings, especially in the deliberation guided around the Sector Plans linked to NPCC.
When observing the FBMC, is possible to identify that the inclusiveness increased the governance, 
contemplating technical and political, allowed greater dialogue, not only between the managers of the 
respective Ministries responsible for formulating the Sectorial Plans, but also among other key actors 
to effectiveness of Sector Plans. This is directly related to the model of FBMC and to the governance of 
the Brazilian political on climate change. 
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In view the importance of institutional design, characterized by a diversity of intergovernmental actors 
involved, while there was a process of inclusiveness associated with a variety of political actors (especially 
other Ministries) participating in a more or less cooperative - through initiatives such as sectorial 
policies promoting sectoral Consultation related to climate change. The institutional development of 
the Brazilian politics governance of climate change, especially after the Decree 7.390/2010, defined the 
power regulatory and regulator of the Brazilian policy on climate change.
The demarcation was taken as a credit to prevent institutional inertia, since it was left to Inter-ministerial 
Committee on Climate Change (INTER-MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON CLIMATE CHANGE [ICCC]) the role 
of regulatory instrument (so its assignment in coordinate and formulate PNMC) and to the ICGCC the 
instrument role of “regulator” (advises on sectorial policies, inventories and eligibility of CDM - clean 
development mechanism projects in the country) and on the FBMC fit the role of a tool for political 
consultation and “accountability” of the Brazilian politics of climate change.
However, what could prevent a scenario of political competition and discordant decision-making 
powers that would increase the already high cost of an environmental policy transaction, such as on 
climate change, which required an effective diversity of actors in its governance?
The institutional model adopted in Brazil for regulating (and co-formulation) its policies on climate 
change is strongly characterized by an intersectional structure. In case of an environmental policy with 
superlative dimension and wide implications, especially from economic point of view, the institutional 
design of ICGCC included not only the political composition involving the theme, but the involved 
interdisciplinary technical nature.
3 INSTITUTIONALIZATION GOALS AND DECISION MAKING IN THE POLITICAL 
PROCESS AT ICGCC
The Kyoto Protocol, a subsidiary instrument to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, is widely disseminated in the Brazilian legal and academic environment as a soft law 
instrument. In other words, when an instrument is designated as soft law it is understood that it does 
not generates legal obligations between the parties, it cannot establish or implement accountability 
in case of noncompliance by the parties, it waives the formalities of conclusion and termination of 
the treaties and it does not present control of the creative sources. This position, in the matter of the 
legal nature of the Protocol, is truly a nonsense. First because it was pointed out by the parties as a 
legal instrument related to the Framework Convention, in addition, the Protocol has undergone both 
internationally and nationally required formalities for treaty adoption².
As a “country in transition to a market economy”, Brazil’s role in the Kyoto Protocol was restricted to 
compliance with the rules contained in the Clean Development Mechanism. Thus, according to art. 
12 of the Protocol, Brazil should promote and benefit from project activities that result in emission 
reductions. The ICGCC was created by the Presidential Decree of July 7, 1999, to fulfill the role of the 
“designated national authority” to articulated the governmental actions resulted in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and its subsidiary instruments (that Brazil is part of). 
In this way, it is the responsibility of the inter-ministerial body to carry out the obligations established 
in the Protocol, specially, to comply with the rules of the clean development mechanisms. It is worth 
mentioning that clean development mechanisms are subject to the authority and guidance of the 
Conference of the Parties at the meetings of the Parties to this Protocol and to the oversight of an 
executive council. To that end, ICGCC is responsible for certifying emissions reductions resulting from 
each project activity, providing inputs to government positions in the negotiations under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and subsidiary instruments, and liaising with 
entities representative of the civil society.
The Inter-ministerial Commission on Global Climate Change (ICGCC) followed since its institutionalization, 
a model of intersectoral policy coordination, which proved that coordination characterized by a wide 
negotiation space ended up serving as a model for other institutions created for the purpose to 
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assist in the decision-making process of Brazilian politics of climate change. This joint participation 
in the decision-making did not imply, however, in some decision-making competence sharing. In 
the environmental policy process, the operative capacity is given to an institution because of the 
environmental institutional framework drawn by the international environmental regime. 
The wide participation of several ministries at ICGCC (initially, eleven and later the total of seventeen) 
did not, however, meant a dispersion of the decision-making power by providing a large political-
institutional consultation on policy matters concerned (climate change will). Actually, there was a 
concentration of decision-making power, this concentration designed in order to enable dynamic and 
not institutional inertia. The case of climate change, within the Brazilian environmental policy process 
illustrates this case, especially in the two institutions with greater decision-making power in the 
formulation of public policies involving climate change under the leadership of ICGCC: the Ministries of 
Science, Technology & Innovation and Environment.
The analytical criterion for the definition of what the ministries with greater decision-making power 
engaged in ICGCC, where M, C, T & I and MMA, has established in some institutional assignments. 
During the governments of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, the 
presidency ICGCC duty of the minister of  Science, Technology & Innovation (as well as the Executive 
Secretary of the Commission), while the vice-presidency it is up to the Minister of the Environment, 
with a representative of the Commission at other ministries.
Although ICGCC is an institutional organization whose model of governance demands not only a diversity 
of political actors (ministries), but also assign to the same decision-making power, it is considered that 
the institutional design of ICGCC enabled both vertical and horizontal decision-making process, thus 
that did not incur in institutional immobility or operative paralysis. That, however, did not prevent 
divergent perceptions among policy makers interviewed about Brazilian politics of climate change, as 
can be seen in more than one immersion in the field.
In the period from March 13 to 16, 2010, the field research toke place in Brasilia - Federal District. The 
focus was the ICGCC and MMA. The method applied was some semi structured interviews (eleven 
cases) and in depth (two cases) with representatives from the Ministries of Science, Technology & 
Innovation and Environment, their respective Presidency and General Secretariat (MC, T & I) and Vice - 
President (MMA) of the ICGCC, combining this approach with the documentary analysis.
The interviews were conducted at the Department of Climate Change of the Ministry of Environment, 
Department of Environment and Special Issues of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and into the ICGCC 
headquarters located in the Ministry of Science, Technology & Innovation. Briefly, it can be observed, 
during the interviews, a “split” of perspectives around which more operational and efficient mechanisms 
in environmental policy and relationally, in Brazilian politics of climate change.
The division of perception of policy makers, in which the position of the Ministry of Environment 
was minority, reflected a “more or less developmental” perspective on the adoption of economic 
instruments such as most appropriate mechanisms to encourage the development of a low carbon 
economy in the country.
This difference of perception on the use of market mechanisms, for the purpose of implementing 
sustainable development has been strengthened especially during the interview with the Executive 
Secretary of the Inter-ministerial Commission on Global Climate Change³, even though the policy maker 
has noted that the operationalization of the preventive regulatory mechanisms have be encouraged 
by part of all the actors involved in the ICGCC, in the formulation of Brazilian politics of global climate 
change matter. 
The political actors behavior (directly dependent on the functions performed as well as the incentives 
and constraints) in the decision making process of Brazilian politics of climate change depends directly 
on the institutional rules that determine the roles and responsibilities of each actor in the political 
process on policy formulation of the Brazilian climate change. For example, the Executive Secretary 
of ICGCC has to be subordinated to  M, S, T & I and not to the MMA, as stipulated in Decree nº 6,263.
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Throughout this study, it was sought to perform cycles of semi-structured interviews (and some in 
depth) with policy makers (in part due to the turnover of ministerial representatives at ICGCC) and, 
among the new interviews, in 2011, the Department of Climate Change of the Ministry of Environment 
was visited, and again at of ICGCC headquarters located in the Ministry of Science, Technology & 
Innovation. Briefly, it was observed along the in-depth interviews, the division of “agendas” in Brazilian 
politics of climate change, especially as to its more or less “environmental” character.
These “decisional agenda” differences and also in choosing which the best mechanisms for mitigation 
and adaptation to climate change, were strengthened during some interviews, throughout the survey, 
conducted between 6th and June 7, 2011 with the Executive Secretary of the Inter-ministerial Commission 
on Global climate Change⁴, even though the policy maker has noted that the operationalization of 
preventive regulatory mechanisms is premise and encouragement on the part of all actors involved in 
the formulation ICGCC of  the Brazilian politics on global climate change.
During one of the interviews, for example, the Executive Secretary of ICGCC was asked if the 
operationalization premise of a preventive regulatory mechanisms would be referenced on the 
Precautionary Principle - which was confirmed by him - even knowing that the efficiency of the 
Precautionary Principle has limitations and distinct perspective. This plural perspective was observed in 
in-depth interviews conducted in the Department of Environmental Quality and Climate Change – MMA.
This view was reinforced by the representatives of MCT & I and MMA as well as by ministerial 
representatives in ICGCC in 2010 and 2011, through interviews conducted in person (with the Executive 
Secretary of ICGCC and Director of the Department of Environmental Quality and Climate Change 
MMA) and by email in 2012 (with 11 ministerial representatives in ICGCC). We attempted to develop 
and apply the same qualitative issues, which can be seen in Table 1, as their responses percentage.
Table 1 - Perceptions of Policy Makers on Political Decision-Making Process involving the governance of the 
Brazilian Policy on Global Climate Change. 
Questions
(1) 1.In your opinion, was important to the Inter-
ministerial Committee on Climate Change “inherit” from 
the Inter-ministerial Commission on Global Climate 
Change a political process facilitated for the formulation 
of the National Plan on Climate Change for its longer 
institutionalization?
(2) There are institutional channels such as joint regular 
meetings between Brazilian Inter-ministerial Commission 
on Global Climate Change and Climate Change Forum. Do 
you think technically and politically importants?
(3) Was there some degree of conflict of the decision-
making powers between the institutions involved in the 
formulation of the National Plan for Climate Change?
(4) The participation of the Brazilian Climate Change 
Forum was relevant to the formulation of the National 
Plan for Climate Change?
Total
100%
100%
40%
100%
None
-
-
30%
-
Not much
20%
30%
10%
20%
Few
10%
50%
-
-
Lot
70%
20%
-
80%
Perception of the Policy Makers
Source: By the authors
On Table 1, it is only possible to visualize the panel of questions that was made to the policy makers 
and the percentage of responses. All the interviewees worked in the biennium 2010 and 2011, directly 
with the governance of the Brazilian political of climate change and were selected according to their 
respective technical functions in ICGCC due to the determination that they ought to be in the status of 
ministerial representatives in the ICGCC.
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It was observed that only one question was not answered by all the interviewees precisely the question 
that addressed the perception of the policy makers on the degree of conflict of the decision-making 
powers between the institutions involved in the formulation the National Plan for Climate Change. 
Apparently, the policy makers who did not answered to this question preferred to refrain from pointing 
out a conflict between the institutions involved in the formulation of the Brazilian political of climate 
change, a process in which the ICGCC was directly involved.
The absence of a response to be observed concomitantly with personal interviews cited in this topic, 
indicates not a degree of conflict, according to this survey, but a very clear distinction between the 
responsibilities of each agency involved in the formulation of the Brazilian policy climate change. 
However, while it is possible to infer (through second question) that the policy makers perception, 
allocated into the ICGCC, see as something positive the “consociational” character of Brazilian policy 
on climate change governance. From their point of view, the technical basis was the most relevant 
element of this policy.
The differences in the institutional space qualification of the ICGCC and FBMC, for example, was 
frequently emphasized. In the case of FBMC, would occur less technical decisiveness and greater 
accountability for their consultative, inclusive and rendering of accounts character. This aspect has 
even been emphasized in an interview with the Executive Secretary of ICGCC, in charge. According to 
José Domingos Gonzalez Miguez, Executive Secretary of ICGCC interviewed at the time, the ICGCC is 
different from the Brazilian Forum on Climate Change:
(...) It consists of technical team from the Ministries, whose main goal is to properly address 
this Brazilian policy [of climate change]. The very character of the Commission is much more 
technical because of their assignments, different from Forum [refers to the Brazilian Forum on 
Climate Change] which is a more political space⁵.
The development of sectoral policies related to climate change in the last four years, from the point of 
view of the interviewees, in interviews and previously mentioned cycle, was seen as a positive aspect 
of inclusive political dimension of the issue and the derived horizontal accountability, understood the 
measures of political inclusiveness as required by the interviewees. This, according to the hypothesis of 
this research, results in a democratic operational governance in Brazil on climate change policy.
Returning to the analysis of the carried out interviews, a comparison between FBMC and ICGCC, 
for example, the first one is characterized by a more political and less technical dimension in its 
activities in the Brazilian climate policy guidelines for policy makers of ICGCC, observing in this case, 
a more participatory approach from the standpoint of the relationship between government and civil 
society, while ICGCC would characterize itself by a more technical body, although it was emphasized 
in the interviews, the recognition of a political dimension in the deliberative process of the work 
developed by ICGCC.
The ICGCC, as the Designated National Authority, is responsible for the issuing of Opinions on CDM 
(clean development mechanism projects). The ICGCC analyses the projects, the eligible requirements 
and the possibility to convert the project’s results into carbon credits, as well as the accreditation of the 
“operational entities designated”. It also checks and validates the results in terms of effective cutting 
of the GGE emissions. This role was formally recognized in 2002, when the ICGCC was nominated the 
“designated national authority” by the CDM Executive Board.
The political aspect of the technical decisions involving the decision making of the ICGCC can be divided 
into four key policy objectives that can be seen in Table 2:
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Table 2 - Objectives and Political Decision-Making Process, in CIMMGC.
POLITICAL OBJECTIVES
(1) Coordinating and promoting within the federal public 
administration, policies to reduce GHG emissions, to 
adapt and reduce socioeconomic vulnerability to the 
negative effects of climate change.
(2) Dispose exclusively eligibility criteria of CDM projects
(3) To aid in assistance to the Ministry of Foreign Relations, 
on the placements of negotiation on climate change by the 
federal government in the international context
(4) Deliver opinions on plans, programs and projects 
of sectoral policies, technical standards and legislation 
relevant to the national policy to mitigate and adapt to 
global climate change
Yes
X
X
X
No
X
DEMAND A NETWORK SHARED DECISION MAKING?
Source: By the authors
All four key policy objectives are directly linked to an interdependent environmental policy process, 
since the matter that is governed by the ICGCC policies is interdependent. However, it is important to 
point that out of the four policy objectives mentioned, only the second goal requires a decision-making 
process in the ICGCC, not including other co-involved institutions as an institutional instrument for 
the performance of the National Plan on Climate Change, like FBMC or Executive Group on Climate 
Change (EGCC) linked to Inter-ministerial Committee on Climate Change (ICCC) and MMA. Therefore, 
the political process surrounding the CDM - clean development mechanism - will be analyzed under 
the three analytical categories: (1) political inclusiveness, (2) accountability in decision making and (3) 
democratic governance.
It’s the endogenous decision process, however, that will be operationalized analytically for the purpose 
of answering a question: how, in this case, the institutional design of ICGCC served as the political vector 
and not institutional inertia in the face of a scenario whose rule-making decision occurs under the 
principle of unanimity? It was sought, through the document analysis qualitative technique, combined 
with the semi-structured interviews, answer the question.
The CDM is constituted as a key-element to the Brazilian climate change policy data. Unlike the other 
three policy objectives ICGCC, which are the responsibility of the institution, but politically active in 
networking with other institutions responsible for policy and National Plan on Climate Change and 
its consequent management responsibilities, the CDM - clean development mechanism is the sole 
and exclusive jurisdiction of the ICGCC and, as a market instrument for the Brazilian policy of climate 
change, an active fundamental policy.
Given this information about the rules applied on the decision-making process, based on the principle 
of unanimity, is possible to affirm that the institutional responsibility is unequal. The greater the 
number of actors with veto power, the greater the chances of decisional paralysis (TSEBELIS, 2009). An 
institutional design the way the ICGCC was, with its decision process anchored on the rule of unanimity, 
generates an operative paralysis and institutional immobility. What, in theory, would interfere in the 
political leadership that is in the ICGCC’s goals.
The imperative of the rule of the decision making, based on the principle of unanimity does not interfere 
in decisions about the eligibility criteria for CDM projects. This non-interference derives directly from 
the decision-making process surrounding the processing of submission and approval of a CDM project 
configuration. When we consider, along the trajectory of ICGCC, total approved projects (386), with 
approved exceptions (04), in a review (11) and no highly disapproved, is attested from the analytical 
point of view, a high performance Brazilian projects, which is politically capitalized by the Brazilian 
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government. CDM projects are designed within a framework of four determinations: (1) submitted 
activities, (2) approved activities, (3) activities approved, qualified or (4) activities under review.
The direct participation of the ICGCC in this process occurs only after The Designated Operational 
Entity certify the additionality of the project and thus eliminating prima facie, a possible process of 
decisional paralysis around the approval or disapproval of a project. According to ICGCC itself, project 
activities are considered to be submitted only after verification by the Executive Secretariat, that all 
documentation regarding the status of project activities is within the resolutions of the institution: 
“After this check, the documentation is published at electronic media, on the electronic website of the 
Ministry of Science and Technology” (BRAZIL, INTER-MINISTERIAL COMMISSION OF GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE, 2009: 35-36).
Whereas the veto power that could be exercised by a representative in ICGCC, works to prevent 
the development of policies, the character of previous quality control of the CDM projects by the 
Designated Operational Entity, considerably reduces the transaction cost around approval / validation 
for CDM projects.
Although the “weak sustainability”, contained in the very principle of the CDM, for example, is debatable, 
the adherence of the proposed CDM gained special consistency by the market players and especially, 
for the Brazilian government. The CDM is seen by the Brazilian government as a resource and strategic 
opportunity for promotion and development of instruments to minimize the socio-economic costs of 
climate change for the country. This perspective is clearly highlighted in the National Plan on Climate 
Change (NPCC).
CDM is the main existing economic instrument for the promotion of voluntary measures to mitigate 
GGE emissions. The success of this instrument, in Brazil, and the still existent potential, for the 
implementation of new project activities, under the CDM, are noteworthy. In this sense, the National 
Plan will preserve the CDM project activities additionality in Brazil, considering that this is an effective 
economic instrument to promote actions to mitigate emissions of greenhouse gases in the country 
(PNMC, 2008: 14).
The Brazilian government’s political incentive for the adhesion of economic agents to the CDM as 
a viable, economical and environmentally market mechanism (albeit environmentally sustainable 
outcomes for many types of projects are inconsistent), is reflected as an end result of political incentive, 
in the number of the Brazilian CDM projects certified by the CDM Executive Board (INTER-MINISTERIAL 
COMMISSION OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, 2009).
One of the most important assignments of the ICGCC for the Brazilian politics of global climate change, 
and one of its policy objectives is to certify the voluntary involvement⁶ of participants in a CDM project 
and, in the case of the host Party, that the activities of the CDM project contributes to sustainable 
development of the country (BRAZIL, INTER-MINISTERIAL COMMISSION OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, 
2009). This aspect concerning the granting of the character of sustainable development for CDM 
projects reflects a problem as the decision-making process surrounding the approval / validation for 
the CDM projects.
By observing the decision-making procedure on the approval / validation of a CDM project in Brazil, it 
was noticed that it increased the transparency in the process of review and approval. All of this, under 
the responsibility of ICGCC, the Designated National Authority. It also grants and classifies what can be 
called a sustainable project. 
Although there are five criteria to rate the sustainability of the projects⁷, there is no civil society 
consultation at the approval / validation stage. There is only a later disclosure of the methodology, 
the measured contribution and the implementation sector of the project with the environmental and 
social benefits. 
The deliberation on the project’s sustainability (environmental and social) is reduced due to the 
criterion of exclusivity granted to ICGCC operative, supported by the National Policy on Climate Change 
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and the NPCC itself, lacking political and institutional incentive for the opening of the internal decision-
making process involving eligibility of CDM projects. The democratic control over the characterization 
of sustainability of CDM projects would be low, which, however, does not feature a stricto sensu in 
ICGCC bureaucratic insulation, it is believed.
When members of ICGCC were interviewed, they reinforced, mostly, that a greater space negotiation 
increases the operational costs of CDM projects, that’s why the decision on the eligibility of the 
projects is not open to the civil society. Therefore, this decisions constitute the FBMC key initiative in 
the governance of Brazilian policy on climate change.
By owning differentiated institutional tasks of FBMC, the lack of participation of social actors on the 
definition of eligibility of the CDM projects, grants the ICGCC the political process in this regard, low 
social accountability (although there is an effective horizontal accountability) and serious risk of loss of 
criteria of environmental sustainability of the projects, in favor of less sustainable approaches. The risk 
of decisional paralysis, therefore, was strongly reduced by the existence of an institutional mechanism: 
the exclusive jurisdiction granted to ICGCC eligibility.
Although an institution characterized as a technique in its political process, ICGCC, as it was revealed 
by the description of its activities and policy analysis of the decision-making process, reflected in its 
institutional design the consociational model of the Brazilian political of climate change. This was 
due to the sharing of power and greater participation of political actors, allowing higher quality and 
democratic representation in the decision process involving a climate change policy.
Politically designed as an institutional instrument for the performance of the National Policy on Climate 
Change, the ICGCC more cooperated than competed politically around of which political model to be 
formulated and operationalized by the Brazilian government. The reasons for this are identified by 
rules and institutional arrangements of the National Policy on Climate Change itself. It is considered 
that the reproduction of this consociational institutional model stimulated the spread of sectoral 
policy initiatives relating to climate change, enhancing greater policy making - from the point of view 
of dispersion and capillarity - and horizontal accountability itself and to a lesser extent social, derived 
from the institutional model adopted in Brazil.
It was identified, in this kind of institutional design, used to shape the Brazilian institutions’ responsibility 
on climate change, an institutional governance model guided, since the establishment of ICGCC, to a 
polyarchical institutional arrangement and understanding. Here, a consociational model is the vector of 
the Commission political decision. Therefore, a more polyarchical institutional design (characterized by 
inclusiveness and participation of multiple political actors) was the model adopted for the institutional 
instruments of the National Policy on Climate Change. Although the model was characterized by a 
character of power-sharing and political representation mentioned, it keeps natural assignments to 
each institution in the political decision-making process. Those assignments prevented the decisional 
paralyses on the development of the policies related to climate change and also, in the case of ICGCC, 
it didn’t paralyzed the delivering of opinions on CDM.
Reminding Stein and Tommasi (2006), policies are a direct result of the decision-making process and do 
not constitute exogenously, with respect to institutions for which policies are formulated. The ICGCC 
therefore retained all the other institutions consociative characteristics, involved in the Brazilian politics 
of climate change, namely: political inclusiveness and a character of strengthening in the horizontal 
accountability (and less social) in its decision-making political process without incurring in institutional 
immobility and decisional paralysis.
4 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
The National Climate Change Action Plan, as well as policies, marginal  ministerial programs to NPCC, 
funding mechanisms (Climate Fund) and political participation (as public consultations directly linked to 
marginal policies to climate change policy) indicate high degree of decisional horizontality (intersectoral 
and interagency coordination of governmental measures) and policy responsiveness (diversity of actors 
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and institutions and “accountability” involved), reinforcing the character of polyarchical process of 
climate change policies cycle in Brazil, although the existing cooperation has been often contradictory.
A political environment that facilitates cooperation, in this regard, facilitates the governance and 
reduces the transaction costs involving more interdependent policies, on the institutional point of view, 
something that international institutions which finance programs and projects in the climate change 
area recommends in their reports. In political environments, with more cooperation, public policies 
tend to be of a better quality, less sensitive to political shocks and more adaptable to the changing on 
the economic and social conditions.
The result was not only to create more responsive institutions to the environmental quality - placing 
climate change as an environmental political problem and not just economic - and the more consensual 
democratic game, but also in fostering actions and cross-cutting policy measures as Public Queries, the 
Sector Plans and Funding related to climate change.
Sectoral Plans, for example, stimulate greater political horizontality of the topic and greater wingspan of 
marginal initiatives in mitigating and adapting to climate change by political actors directly or indirectly 
linked to National Climate Change Plan and, moreover, engender further policy goals, although in some 
cases contradictory in relation to the control of the effects of climate change contained in the National 
Plan on Climate Change policy itself.
A feature of the governance of the Brazilian policy on climate change was the horizontality policy 
involving dozens of political actors directly or indirectly linked to the Brazilian policy of climate change. 
All the political process unlocking, around the National Climate Change Plan - from the point of view of 
negotiation between the actors to devise an agreed policy possible, due to the pre- institutionalization 
of the process - enabled, formally, the “rapid” development of National Climate Change Plan before the 
National Policy on Climate Change enactment.
The results showed that the inclusivity characterized by the political coordination model did not 
produced decisional paralysis and institutional inertia but, on the contrary, fostered governance into 
the decision-making process. In creating the ICGCC, for example, the Brazilian government opted 
for a more consociational institutional model - without losing the technical character of politics - to 
formulate and regulate the Brazilian policy on global climate change.
There was, in this regard, not only institutional reinforcement - institutional and cross-sectoral - but a 
more horizontal and responsive institutional strengthening in the political process, especially due to 
the ICGCC institutional design and to the responsibilities and clearly defined political objectives in the 
Policy and in the National Plan on Climate Change.
NOTES
1The Inter-ministerial Committee on Climate Change (MIC) and Executive Group on Climate Change (EGCC) (Executive Group 
on Climate Change) are the institutions responsible for inter-ministerial coordination involving Brazilian politics of climate 
change and the regulatory character of the National Policy and Plan on Climate Change.
2The Convention was signed by Brazil in New York on 9 May 1992; Approved by the National Congress through Legislative 
Decree n. 1, dated February 3, 1994; Entered into force on March 21, 1994; The Brazilian Government deposited the instrument 
of ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention on February 28, 1994, and became effective in Brazil on May 29, 
1994; Internally, was promulgated and published by the Presidential Decree n. 2,652, dated July 1, 1998.
3The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is 
to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level 
should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that 
food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner (art. 2).
4Approved by Legislative Decree n. 144 of June 20, 2002, ratified by Brazil on August 23, 2002 (according to the rules of the 
Protocol, Article 25.3) and promulgated and published internally by Presidential Decree n. 5,445, dated May 12, 2005.
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5BASTOS, Branca. Interview, March 14, 2010.
6MIGUEL, José Domingos Gonzalez. Interview, March 14, 2010.
7MIGUEZ, José Domingos Gonzalez. Interview, on 14th of March and 6th of, June, 2011.
8MIGUEZ, José Domingos Gonzalez. Interviewed, 14th of March,2010.
9The principle of voluntariness infers the absence, in the legal systems of the Parties, mandatory rules to require the 
achievement of reduction of GGE emissions through the CDM projects. However, although the Brazilian legal system does not 
prescribe rules requiring the completion of the CDM in the country, it is possible to identify mandatory standards related to 
eligible activities such as CDM, especially in case of reforestation in areas of permanent preservation, provided by the Brazilian 
Forest Code.
10The criteria, according to CIMMGC would be: “(1) Contribution to local environmental sustainability; (2) Contribution to the 
development of working conditions and net job creation; (3) Contribution to the distribution of income; (4) Contribution to 
empowerment and technological development; (5) Contribution to regional integration and coordination with other sectors.” 
Available in: http://www.mct.gov.br/index.php/content/view/320869/Contribuicao_para_o_Desenvolvimento_Sustentavel.
html Last access February 3, 2013.
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